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APPELL.ANT'S REPLY BRil'.J 
SCOPE OF BRIEF 
~lpptllant mge~ in Point I of his opening brief 
that 1uasn1L1cl 1 as the i un· determined that Mr. Men-
kl\·e ~11hsta11tially perf'on;ied the obligations described 
111 Iii~ (·o~t-pl11s C'o11traC't with the Respondent, he was 
entitled to a .i udgment base<l upon his actual cost plus 
10'" 1 
• He urged that there was no credible evidence 
frolll which ~lw .iun· l'o11ld reasonablv determine that 
the daimed co.~h \\~ere not incurred.· Judgment not-
I 
withstanding the verdict should have been ente · reu, 
therefore, in the sum of $49,061.56. (Appellant's Brie:. 
pp. 13-24). Respondent atJ:empts, in her Statement 111 
Facts and in Point I of the Argument, to point towarl 
evidence from which the jury might infer that ;ud 
costs were not incurred. Thus the Respondent's Bnet 
attempts to argue new matter that was not presenteu 
in Appellant's Brief. This Reply Brief, therefore, 1, 
filed pursuant to the provisions of Rule 75 (p). Appel· 
lant does not waive the arguments made in Points II 
through V of his original brief by not reiterating the;n 
here or by not replying in detail to other argumenb 
contained in the Respondent's Brief. 
POINT I. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IGNORES THI 
UNDISPUTED FACT THAT APPELLAXT 
SUBSTANTIALLY PERFORMED HIS COX· 
TRACT. 
Respondent refers, on pages 18 and 19 of htr 
brief, to the court's Instruction No. 12, as follows: 
"In a cost-plus-percentage contract with ~1 
licensed builder, an owner has the right_ to expect 
the same skill and abilitv to be applied to the 
work as would have be~n applied if the c~nd 
tractor had undertaken the work for a fixe 
price. 
. I d f d t to establish The burden 1s upon t 1e e en an · · ! 
that he proceeded honestly and skillfully 
8111 
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with due regard to the rights of the plaintiff. 
ln this connection, you are instructed that a con-
tractor does not have the right to expend any 
amount of money he sees fit upon such a contract, 
regardless of the propriety, necessity or honesty 
of the expenditure, but must show that the monies 
he daims to have expended were reasonably paid 
for materials and work on the job." 
Tl1e significance of the instruction is made apparent 
11·hen it is laid along side the applicable provisions of 
the contract in the instant case. Paragraph G of the 
wntract \Exhibit 1) provided: 
.. It is mutually agreeable that builder and 
owner have a mutual interest, that of building 
the best home possible for the owner, and at the 
most reasonable cost possible ,and that all efforts 
shall be expended in this direction." 
Paragraph E of the agreement provided in sub-
stance tnat the owner should assume the responsibility 
ul' actp1iring Lids and submitting them to the owner 
IJ<"fore a 11 ards are made to subcontractors, and that the 
U1e owner should have the right to accept or reject bids. 
Paragraph C p;·ovided an accounting procedure where-
hr statemeuts were t(J be submitted by the contractor 
to tlic owner within a reasonable time. In Instruction 
Xo. rn, The court instructed the jury that in order to 
tind that Appellant had substantially performed under 
the contract, he 
. . must 1n·ove by a preponderance of the 
e\'1deuce that he ( 1) exercised reasonable skill 
and judgment in letting subcontracts, in per-
3 
forming his own work, and in supervising hi, 
workmen an? s~bcontractors; ( 2) performed 
the construction m a reasonable time; (3\ ren-
dered statements reasonably; and ( 4) exerte 
his . best efforts toward constructing the Shu~: 
residence at the most reasonable cost possible." 
The jury found, in answer to Special Interrogator1 
No. I, that the Appellant substantially performed !us 
obligations under the contract ( R. 133). Respondent 
admits that this finding by the jury is supported by 
the evidence. (cf Respondent's Brief, p. 2). 
Integrating the court's Instruction No. 12 with 
the applicable provisions of the contract, therefore, it 
is admitted on this appeal that the Appellant "pr11· 
ceeded honestly and skillfully and with due regard t11 
the right of the plaintiff"; that the contractor did not 
expend any amount of money, regardless of propriety. 
but he showed that the amount of money he claimed 
to have expended was reasonably paid for materiab 
and work on the job. (cf. Instruction No. 12.) If he 
had not performed these obligations, then under the 
instructions of the court the jury could not have found 
that he substantially performed the contract. 
It is this undisputed fact that distinguishes the 
authorities cited by the Respondent on pages 19. ~ 11 
and 21 of her brief. In Shaw v. Bula Cannon Shops 
Inc., 205 Miss. 458, 38 So. (2d) 916, the court held i!i 
substance that if the contractor did not substantiall)· 
h t t should perform on a cost-plus contract, t e con rac or 
be awarded only a reasonable cost. The quotation fron: 
4 
I 
...ill 
the case 011 page 20 of Respondent's Brief makes this 
po~ition clear. In Walsh Services v. Feek (1954), 45 
Ir ash. ( ~d) 289. 27 4 P. ( 2d) 117, the court determined 
explicitly that the cost-plus contractor had not per-
formed un<ler his contract; that the work was not given 
adequate or proper supervision, and that the contractor 
added some extras which were not authorized. In the 
Walsh S ercice case the trial court made specific find-
ings of fact refiecting which items were allowed on a 
cost-plus basis and which items were disallowed. The 
contractor knew specifically which bills were deemed 
to be excessiw and which items were approved by the 
trial judge. Cases cited by Appellant on page 21 of 
his brief are to the same effect. Some of these cases 
actually support the Appellant's position here. Wen-
dell 0. Ma,ijlJury ( 1954) 7 5 So. ( 2d) 379, for example, 
awards the contractor the exact amount of his costs 
plus 10~~ after deducting for two specific items which 
\\'ere in dispute. There, as here, there was a dispute 
as to the provisions of the contract. After holding 
that the rn11tract was on a cost-plus basis, and deter-
mining that specific items were not recoverable, the 
contractor was mvarded judgment in the appropriate 
amount. The courts have held that where the contractor 
has not fulfilled the obligations imposed, either under 
the term~ of the contract or by law, that he is entitled 
to recoyer based upon reasonable costs rather than 
cost-plus. Courts have also held that a cost-plus con-
tractor has the same obligations as a fixed-fee con-
tractor in exercising reasonable judgment with respect 
to costs incurred. 
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In the case at bar, there is a specific, undisputeri 
finding that Menlove Construction Company satisfit,
1 
its obligation. The contractor constructed the '·best 
home possible for the owner and at the most reasonah 
cost possible." (cf. Plaintiff's Exhibit 1). 
The instances of claimed default by the contractor. 
as referred to particularly on page 16 of Respondent, 
brief, were necessarily considered by the jury and wm 
necessarily rejected insofar ~s they were offered fw 
the purpose of showing that the Appellant had not 
substantially performed. 
In Point III of this brief, Appellant demonstrates 
that each of the deficiencies upon which Respondent 
relies was actually approved or ratified during the 
course of construction. The record-keeping procedure1 
were approved; invoices reflecting the items now ~eize1: 
upon as "non-cost" items were paid. Respondent i· 
being charged with failure to require Max l\Ienlor. 
to spend more time on the job while complaining !liar 
the cost of Max Menlove's time is excessive. (cf. Re· 
spondent's Brief, pp. 6, 7, 16). Yet Respondent paid 
invoices in evidence as Exhibits 5 through 8 where the 
time rate of Max :Menlove was explicitly stated. 
Appellant submits that the arguments made hi 
Respondent on page 16 of her brief, and the fact~ 
referred to on pages 4 to 13 might properly hare been 
considered on the basic question as to whether Appel· 
lant substantially performed, but they are not coui· 
petent in considering the issue of actual costs. It 
6 
, \ ppdlant is denied recovery of specific items, he is 
cutitled to know what they are so that he can protect 
himself "·itb suppliers and subcontractors accordingly . 
. \t ~hi~ juncture Respondent is bound by the jury's 
dettrmination that ~Ir . .:'\Ienlove (I) exercised reason-
able skill and judgment in letting subcontracts, in per-
·,<lrming bis own work and in supervising his workmen 
awl subcontractors; ( 2) performed the construction 
in a reaso11a ble time; ( 3) rendered statements reason-
ably; all<I I J) exerted his best efforts toward construct-
ing the re~i<lence at the most reasonable cost possible. 
\cf Instruction 19, R. 112). Moreover, the Respondent 
is precluded from asserting that the specific reqmre-
ments of Exhibit l were not satisfied. 
POINT II. 
HESPONDENT IGNORES THE lJNDIS-
Pl'TED FACT THAT THE ONLY CONTRACT 
H.E'l'WEE~ THE PARTIES WAS THAT AP-
PELLX:\TT \VOULD BE COMPENSATED 
lUSED CPON HIS COSTS PLUS TEN PER 
l'ENT. 
At the trial court level the Respondent initially 
iiiok the position that there was an oral agreement to 
the effect that the Appellant had agreed to construct 
the house for the sum of $35,200.00 ( R. 46, 50). At 
tlte condusio11 of the Respondent's evidence the court 
rule l 1· · 1 < exp 1c1t y that there was no such oral agreement. 
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In explaining his reasonmg on the ruling, the trial 
court said: 
"F~equently in. testimony, Mr. Shupe referreii ' 
~o this as an eshma.te and I think that's what 
it was. As he described it, and further she, a) 
the contracting party, and she was not there at 
the time when this was done and there is prob· 
lems of agency that would appear invoh·ed but 
haven't even been discussed by counsel so for 
as that problem is concerned. I think this is a 
classic case where the parol eYidence rule should 
apply ... I think that the claim must die at this 
point." (R. 487, 488). 
The court explained that the only justification for 1 
considering any evidence of the early com·ersations 
between the parties was to determine whether the Ap· 
pellant had substantially performed his contract. He 
summarized: "If a jury should determine that there 
was substantial performance why then there would he 
only the question of offset." (R. 489). 
In spite of this record at the trial level, the Re· 
spondent continues to refer to the initial preliminan· 
conversations between the parties. (See Respondenh 
Brief, pp. 3, 4, 5, and 16). 
The Appellant submits that, under the theory 
b · on most favorable to Respondent, the only as1s up 
which the original cost estimates have any probatire 
force are on the issue as to whether the Appellant 
substantially performed under the contract. 'fhe jnrr 
. . d 1 t Respondent has determmed that question a verse y o 
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and Respondent does not contest the jury's finding on 
tliis appeal. The jury's determination that the Appel-
lant substantially performed is dis positive with respect 
to the issue. The Respondent is asking this court to 
place credence upon the very evidence which the jury 
rejected in determining the primary issue in the case. 
It is important that the court realize that the issue 
of substantial performance was deemed to be the con-
trolling issue at the trial level. Respondent continues 
to refer to the fact that there are three volumes of 
testimony (Respondent's Brief, p. 14); that there were 
sixty-nine exhibits (Respondent's Brief, p. 4) ; that 
the Respondent called seven witnesses and the Appel-
lant twenty-six witnesses during seven days of trial 
(ibid). The purpose of these witnesses and the neces-
sity for their being called and examined at the trial 
was to prove that the Appellant had substantially 
performed. It was necessary to examine each sub-
contrador and supplier of material as to the nature 
of his relationship with the Appellant. Each major 
:rnb-contractor was called as a witness and testified in 
substance and effect that he had received the same 
kind of supervision and instruction from Mr. Menlove 
as he ordinarily received from contractors constructing 
custom houses. The sub-contractors testified as to the 
conyersations they had with .Mr. Shupe concerning 
the apprornl of the sub-contract and the selection of 
the materials and the supervision of the sub-contractor's 
acfaities h>· .:Ur. Menlove as general contractor. The 
Re~pondent made all of these issues relevant by the 
9 
position she took prior to trial. The Respondent had 
in her possession and available for examination by her 
accountants and lawyers all of the actual records rif 
the Appellant for approximately a year prior to the 
trial and, as stated in Appellant's Brief. She was unable 
to state a single item which did not actually represent 
a cost incurred ( R. 27) . Now having put the Appellant 
to the trouble and expense of proving each one of tht 
claims in detail, Respondent attempts to benefit in 
her brief from the fact that all of the witnesses and 
all of the evidence pointed toward the conclusion that 
the Respondent was erroneous and mistaken in alleg-
ing that there was no substantial performance under 
the contract. 
Recapitulating on this point, the Respondent'~ 
failure to reckon with the finding of the jury on the 
major substantive problem involved in the lawsuit c011· 
stitutes an attempt to divert the attention of this court 
from the legal issue involved on appeal. The Respond· 
ent's recitations of the original conversations betweeu 
the parties are wholly immaterial. They are misleading. 
There was no agreement that the cost oi the house 
was limited to $35,200.00, or any other figure. The 
entire control of the costs of this house was with the 
Shupes. After having personally selected all of the 
items that went into the house the Shupes are now ask· 
. . . d t h'ch required mg the court to sustam a JU gmen w 1 
that Mr. Menlove pay for substantially $6,000.00 worth 
of these costs with his own money. 
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POINT III. 
THE RESPONDENT APPROVED THE 
\'EHY JlllOCEDURES AND COSTS \VHICH 
SHE N"O\\ .\.SSERTS JUSTIFY THE JURY'S 
rERDICT. 
On pages ti through 8 of his original brief, the 
Appellant demonstrated from the record that Mr. 
and }lrs. Shupe approved each sub-contract for each 
phase of construction and that they actually selected 
all of the items of any consequence that went into the 
house. ~o purpose would be served by listing these 
items or even tabulating them here. It is of substantial 
significance that the Respondent does not in her brief 
refer to a single sub-contract or fixture or other item 
of construction which was not approved either by her 
or her husband. 
The Respondent's Brief, however, refers to a 
number of procedures upon which Respondent presum-
ably relies i11 justifying the jury's verdict. On pages 
± et sey_. of lier Statement of Facts, and Page 16 of 
her .. 1rgumeut. Respondent refers to a series of pro-
cedures a1cd iustances presumably relevant to the ques-
tion of 5Uostantial performance. Although these items 
are not belieyed material on the question of actual 
co~ts, they are treated briefly. For the purpose of con-
renieuee, these items are numbered and comment is 
made upon them as follows: 
I. Respondent asserts that she should not haYe 
been charged for social security taxes, payroll taxes, 
11 
unemployment compensation and similar wage cos(, 
(Respondent's Brief, p. 4). The answer to this con-
tention is that she paid four invoices where these cosrs 
were itemized. (Ex. 5, pp. 1-2; Ex. 6, p. 6; Ex. 7, 
p. 1). Mr. Menlove explanied that it was his practiri· 
to add payroll taxes (which include all of the items Iii 
question) to costs on a cost-plus contract; that if he 
did not do so he actually would lose money upon the 
cost of the labor. (R. 339, 340). 
2. Respondent claims that .Max Menlove did nut 
spend enough time on the job and that, therefore, h~ 
was not adequately supervising the men. (Respondent\ 
Brief, p. 6). In this argument, the Respondent is 
totally inconsistent. On the one hand she urges that 
the labor costs, one of which was the time for "·hich 
Max Menlove was compensated, were too high; on the 
other hand she contends that they were not high enough 
- that because Max Menlove was supervising other 
construction, he was not on the job at the Shupe con-
struction. The question of adequate superrision iras 
one of the main issues presented to the jury with respect 
to the question as to whether the Appellant substau-
tially performed the contract. The jury's finding on 
the issue is conclusive. Moreover, the record is clear 
that at no time during construction did l\Ir. Shupe 
complain that Max Menlove did not spend sufficient 
time on the premises. ( R. 250) . 
3. Respondent asserts that different kinds. 01 
records were kept on the Shupe job concerning the :nne 
spent by employees than were kept on other krnd' 
12 
d work. (Respoudent's Brief, p. 6). This contention 
is absolutely inaccurate. The undisputed testimony is 
that thf same records were kept on all housing jo.bs. 
(R. :W5). It is true that Max Menlove testified that 
on cost-plus jobs the labor costs as other costs were 
substantiali,v eon trolled by the owner. (R. 267). The 
record substantiates the observation. Mr. Shupe 
visited the premises nearly every day and gave 
repeated and detailed suggestions to the employees 
and l\Iax concerning the manner in which the work 
should be done (R. 292). Frequent change orders 
required that part of the work be done over. (See ex-
amples in Appellant's Brief, pp. 7-9). Respondent does 
not dispute the fact that at least 100 changes and addi-
tions were made during construction (R. 884). 
4. Respondent asserts that "sometimes competitive 
prices were obtained and sometimes they weren't". 
\Respondents Brief, p. 7. On pages 6 through 9 of 
his original brief, Appellant detailed the instances 
where Mr. Shupe personally approved each sub-con-
tract and each major item of construction. If there 
were instances where competitive bids were waived by 
the Shupes, such waiver is binding upon them and 
they are in no position to now assert that a competitive 
bir:l should haw been obtained. This is particularly 
true wliere the jury found that the Appellant sub-
stantially performed the agreement. (cf. Instructions 
12-2\J ind., R. 105-113). Respondent is unable to cite 
a single instance where she did not approve the arrange-
ment with a subcontractor. 
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5. Respondent asserts that the connete joli 11 , 
eluded OYertime. (Respondent's Brief. p. 8 i. ·n, 
concrete work was performed during Deeember. JUii: 
and January, 1963. l 11 Yo ices for this work was ~uL. 
mitted during the following months. (See Ex .. 5, p.; 
Ex. ()). These inniices were paid. 
6. Respondent complains that no eost breakdo1111 
was made. (Respondent" s Brief. p. 7). It is a rurn1 11 , 
thing that the Hespondent asserts that the i11rniet, 
receiYed in e,·idence as Exhibits J through U indu111t 
are sufficent to enable the jury to determine ,,iJelhtr 
the costs incurred by the Appellant are amply itemized 
(see Respondent's Brief, pp. :W-:2i). an<l that no cu1t 
breakdown was rec1uired to assist the jury in determin· 
ing the application of the cost to the rnriou~ pha'tl 
of construction (Ibid). A ml yet. the Appellant. i 
general contractor with some 30 years' experience. :mi 
)lr. Shupe, a ciYil engineer with some 40 ~-ears' expen· 
ence, who supen·ised the design of the premi~es anl 
personally approyed each and eyery item of eow,trncl:111 
as it occurred, requirecl a cost breakdown to anah:' 
the costs as they were being incurred. If these di.i· 
paratiYe positions do not amply demonstrate that 1.1'1 
Respondent is grasping at straws, it should he obserrei, 
that after haYing all of the actual records of the .. \ppel· 
· l t · l R ·pondenl lant for more than a year prior to t w na . e~ 
. . . 1 ·l . c.:11 w·1' n111 was unable to 1tem1ze a smg e expense " 11 '· 
necessarilv incurred by Appellant during the rouN 
• . I • f \ 11 t'. Brief p11. of constructwn. ( {. '27; c . ~ ppe an s · 
10-11). 
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I. Hespolldeuts assert that the painter was not 
adequately "upenised and that the labor for the paint-
incr 1ras exc:essiYe. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 7-8). The 
1" 
painter rnnde an estimate of $1680.00 (R. 669). The 
te~tunony i~ urnli.->puted that .Mr. Shupe was advised 
that the pamter was to be compensated on a time and 
material basi~ R. 248, ~49). The paint schedule was 
actually prepared by the Shupes after conferences 
betwet:l tnem an<l the architect, George Cannon Young, 
and the Sim pes · decor a tor, Marion Cornwall ( R. 47 4-
.J.7()). The painter was a man of 18 years' experience 
a~ a professional painter (R. 668). He testified that 
the Shupes and the interior decorator directed him 
with respect tu the types of finishes to be applied and 
that lie applied the kind and amount of paint which 
they ordered ( R. 672 et seq.). Respondent objects 
that the painter and his employees were paid by checks 
issued b)· th<e ~..\ppellant. (Respondent's Brief, p. 7). 
It is submitted, hcm·eyer, that there is no basis for the 
complaint and that the workmen were paid directly 
b:1 :1Ienlon· Construction Company. "Thether the 
painter and his employees were paid by the painter 
<Lid tLe paillter reimbursed by .Menlove Construc-
tion Company would not result in a particle of differ-
enc2 iu cost to the Respondent. The painter's em-
ployees \Vere men of 18 years or more experience as 
professionals i R. fi!l8). \\'hen :Mr. Thompson learned 
of tl1e kind of finishes tu he used upon the balcony of 
the ho11se he told )lr. Shupe and .Mr. MenloYe that 
thel'l 11111ild be additional easts of about $200.00 (R. 
15 
690). Appellant submits that the cost of the paint w:i, 
the result of the exacting tastes of the Shupes: )Ii 
l\Ienlove should not be penalized for them. 
8. Respondent labors at length her ,·arious com. 
plaints with respect to alleged sub-standard or faulti 
construction. (Respondent's Brief, pp. 8-ia1. Th.t 
complete answers to all of the minutia of detail recited 
in the brief is that Carl Ohran, the plaintiffs own 
expert witness, testified in substance that in his opinion 
such items as were complained of would all be corned 
by the sum of $1,200 to $1,500 ( R. 353) . After con· 
sidering all of the applicable testimony on the subject, 
the jury determined that the plaintiff was entitled 
to an offset because of defective construction and delay 
in construction in the sum of $1,230 ( R. 133). Appel· 
lant concedes the validity of this finding for the purpost 
of argument on this appeal. (cf. Appellant's B:ief. 
p. 12). Appellant submits that Respondent cann(li 
claim the amount of the off set as found by the jury 
and at the same time use the very items imolred i11 
the offset as an excuse for payment the full amou;~· 
of the cost of construction. Respondent has alrea<l:, 
been allowed the total amount due as a result of any 
defective or inadequate construction. The argument 
k · nt J11 that the same items should be ta en mto accou 
diminishing the recovery on the cost-plus 10% contract 
is erroneous and misleading. 
9. Respondent de11ies in her brief that l\Ir. aun 
f J plr1se :Mrs. Shupe approved each sub-contract or eac 1 ' 
16 
of construction. (Respondent's Brief, p. 13). However, 
ueither the Respondent's Brief nor any testimony 
n<lriuced by the Respondents at the trial tend to refute 
the detailed tnstances of approval of each of the sub-
contractors and each of the items of construction as 
referred to in pages 6 through 8 of the Appellant's 
Brief. 
The following colloquy occurred during the cross-
examination of }Ir. Shupe: 
"(-l. 3Ir. Shupe, you approved the putting of 
laminated sheet rock in the house, did you not? 
A. Yes. 
C-.l. And it's true, isn't it, that there were dis-
eussions with either iVIax or Roy about every-
thing that went into the house as it was being 
built'. 
A. Yes. There may have been some things 
that were not discussed. 
Q. '.Yell. isn't it vour best recollection that 
therP was a diseussion with one or the other 
about eYerything that went into the house? 
A. Not everything. I think that would be 
uncalled for. 
Q. Inviting your attention again to your 
deposition, ~Ir. Shupe, page 51. The question 
was. 'Q. "~as there any discussion with either 
~lax or Rov .Menlove about the redwood beams 
that were ;1sed in construction. A. Of course, 
~here was discussion about ever;ljthing that went 
wto the place. No doubt there was discussion 
about it.' Did you make that answer at that time? 
A. Yes." (Emphasis supplied). 
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This testimony must be compared with the respoihi 
Respondent made to an interrogatory propoundcii 
more than 14 months after the construction was com-
pleted and approximately 12 months after Responde
11 
had been given copies of all of the Appellant's recordi: 
"Interrogatory No. 5: Itemize in detail the 
expenses which plaintiff claims were unnece\-
sarily incurred by the Defendant as alleged in 
paragraph number 7 of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
"Answer: The plaintiff is unable at the pre)· 
ent time to itemize in detail the expenses whil'i1 
were unnecessarily incurred by the defendant." 
Appellant submits that while it is true that }fr 
Shupe equivocated to some extent in his dired exam-
nation, the record demonstrates that he and his 11.lt 
approved the very procedures which they now clain1 
justify paying an amount approximately ~li,000.ilil 
less than the Appellant's costs. 
SUMMARY AND CON CL CS I OX 
In his opening brief, the Appellant asserted ii: 
substance that there was no substantial evidence frorn 
which the jury could find that any of the costs claimeil 
by the defendant were not actually incurred. State,! 
differently, Appellant claims that the jury was per· 
mitted by the trial court to stubbornly refuse to nt 
guided bv competent, credible evidence and that tlw 
• · <l t otwitl1 trial court should have awarded a JU gmen 11 · 
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standing the Yerdict in a sum equal to Appellant's 
actual cu-;t plus 10%. This Reply Brief has demon-
~traced that the arguments made by the Respondent 
in support <Jf the jury's finding are fallacious. The 
jury's determination as to defendant's costs plus 10% 
is not supported by the evidence. The arguments made 
bv the Respondent might conceivably have supported 
a :finding by the jury to the effect that the reasonable 
1·osts of construction were $43,000.00, if the jury had 
been permitted to speculate upon that theory. The 
jmf~ finding that the contract was substantially per-
formed pre,rented their speculating upon the theory 
of reasoEable costs. The result achieved by the jury 
in re;;ponse to the first interrogatory is necessarily in· 
consistent with the jury's determination that the costs 
of construction were only $43,000.00. Either the court 
should haYe granted the Appellant a judgment not-
11ithstanding the wrdict or it should have awarded him 
a ne" trial limited solely to the question of damages. 
Appellant submits that the positions taken by the 
Respondent in her brief reinforce and amplify Appel-
lant's contention. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 10th 
day of March, 1966. 
GEORGE l\I. McMILLAN and 
FRANKLIN D. JOHNSON 
1020 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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